Blurring the Spectrum: Exploring Queer Conservatism by Mejdrich, Austin P.
Eastern Illinois University
The Keep
Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications
2018
Blurring the Spectrum: Exploring Queer
Conservatism
Austin P. Mejdrich
Eastern Illinois University
This research is a product of the graduate program in Political Science at Eastern Illinois University. Find out
more about the program.
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mejdrich, Austin P., "Blurring the Spectrum: Exploring Queer Conservatism" (2018). Masters Theses. 3736.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/3736
The Graduate School� 
E:AsmN�U.MRSJTY-
Thesis Maintenance and Reproduction Certificate 
FOR: Graduate Candidates Completing Theses in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree 
Graduate Faculty Advisors Directing the Theses 
RE: Preservation, Reproduction, and Distribution ofThesis Research 
Preserving, reproducing, and distributing thesis research is an important part of Booth Library's responsibility to 
provide access to scholarship. In order to further this goal, Booth Library makes all graduate theses completed as 
part of a degree program at Eastern Illinois University available for personal study, research, and other not-for­
profit educational purposes. Under 17 U.S.C. § 108, the library may reproduce and distribute a copy without 
infringing on copyright; however, professional courtesy dictates that permission be requested from the author 
before doing so. 
Your signatures affirm the following: 
• The graduate candidate is the author of this thesis. 
•The graduate candidate retains the copyright and intellectual property rights associated with the original 
research, creative activity, and intellectual or artistic content of the thesis. 
•The graduate candidate certifies her /his compliance with federal copyright law (Title 17 of the U. S. Code) and 
her/his right to authorize reproduction and distribution of all copyrighted materials included in this thesis. 
• The graduate candidate in consultation with the faculty advisor grants Booth Library the nonexclusive, perpetual 
right to make copies of the thesis freely and publicly available without restriction, by means of any current or 
successive technology, including but not limited to photocopying, microfilm, digitization, or internet. 
•The graduate candidate acknowledges that by depositing her/his thesis with Booth Library, her/his work is 
available for viewing by the public and may be borrowed through the library's circulation and interlibrary loan 
departments, or accessed electronically. The graduate candidate acknowledges this policy by indicating in the 
following manner: 
L ves, I wish to make accessible this thesis for viewing by the public 
___ No, I wish to quarantine the thesis temporarily and have included the Thesis Withholding Request Form 
•The graduate candidate waives the confidentiality provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) (20 U.S. C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) with respect to the contents of the thesis and with respect to 
information concerning authorship of the thesis, including name and status as a student at Eastern Illinois 
University. I have conferred with my graduate faculty advisor. My signature below indicates that I have read and 
agree with the above statements, and hereby give my permission to allow Booth Library to reproduce and 
Aic:trih11tP mv thesis. My adviser's signature indicates concurrence to reproduce and distribute the thesis. 
!fbtsT1r.J f2 J1 GJDt21e-tf 
P ·nted Name 
� 11c '1L xi�"'{,(.. 
Graduate Degree Program 
Please submit in duplicate. 
8Y-iN p, ·�uec.C 
PE;;; 7-o<Y 
Date 
Blurring the Spectrum: 
Exploring Queer Conservatism 
(TITLE) 
BY 
Austin P. Mejdrich 
THESIS 
SUBMITIED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Master of Arts in Political Science 
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS 
2018 
YEAR 
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING 
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 
THESIS COMMITIEE CHAIR DATE 
DR CHAIR'S DESIGNEE 
THESIS COMMITIEE MEMBER 
DATE THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER 
DATE 
DATE 
DATE 
BLURRING THE SPECTRUM: EXPLORlNG QUEER CONSERVATISM 
AUSTIN P. ME.IDRlCH 
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
MASTER·s THESIS 
201 8 
2 
ABSTRACT 
Running parallel to the groundbreaking and historic advancement of LGBTQ 
rights over the past decade has been the rise in the prominence and public discourse of 
queer conservative thinking. From the Log Cabin Republicans to far-right nationalistic 
politics, queer conservatives underscore both diverging ideologies within the modem 
American conservative tradition and the increase of far-right politics in Western societies. 
This study argues that queer conservatism, while traditionally less explored in the broader 
context of sexuality politics. is consequential to an understanding of the LGBTQ 
community and queer politics. Thus. an exploration of queer conservatism as a political 
ideology is explored. in addition to novel quantitative analyses of this community. 
Additionally. theories are offered to explain the rise of far-right nationalistic views within 
queer conservatism after the 9/1 l and Pulse nightclub terrorist attacks. This study 
concludes that. while queer conservatism is a subset of the LGBTQ community. its 
foundations. legacies. and implications are critical to broader discussions of intersections 
of sexuality. heteronormativity. race. and post-9/11 politics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 12. 2016. almost 47 years to the day from the LGBTQ rights movement-
launching Stonewall Riots. a lone gunman opened fire on Pulse nightclub, an LGBTQ 
club in  Orlando. Florida. After the over three-hour long standoff between the gunman, 
first responders, and negotiators. forty-nine were dead and fifty-three more were 
wounded - most of whom were the Latinx attendees of that evening's "Latin Night" 
(Rothaus 2016; Stolberg and Perez-Pena 2017). The massacre, being the deadliest act of 
violence against American LGBTQ people, shook deeply not only the queer1 community. 
but the wider American consciousness as well, as the Pulse massacre was the deadliest 
terror1st attack conducted on US soil since 9/11 and, until the Las Vegas shooting in 
2017, the deadliest mass shooting in American history. 
Though not as common in more contemporary times. violence and disruption 
directed at queer people in bars, nightclubs. and other gathering spaces holds a lasting 
legacy for lhe LGBTQ community. For decades during the early to mid-twentieth 
century, police raids on largely mafia-owned bars were not uncommon as these 
protections were never treated as gospel. nor in coffee shops and restaurants where drag 
1 A note on language usage in this paper: the term '"queer" is used throughout. Despite 
being commonly known as a derogatory term originally used against the LGBTQ 
community. "'queer'· has gone through a reclamation process by the gender and sexual 
minority community and is now increasingly used within the community. Taken from the 
LGBTQ media monitoring organization GLAAD, queer is generally accepted to mean, 
··An adjective used by some people . . .  whose sexual orientation is not exclusively 
heterosexua1.·· GLAAD also notes: '·Some people may use queer. or more commonly 
genderqueer. to describe their gender identity and/or gender expression" ("GLAAD'"). 
Finally. GLAAD"s reference guide also stipulates "LGBTQ 
.. being the currently accepted 
and preferred acronym for the lesbian. gay. bisexual. transgender. queer. plus, 
community. Because of the diversity of the LGBTQ community, "queer•· is employed in 
this study. --Queer"· is also used to employ the academic sense of the word and non­
heteronormative analyses present in this work. 
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queens, transgender people, and other queer folks gathered2 (faderman 2015).  Indeed. the 
Stonewall Riots began in the early hours of June 28, 1 969 primarily as a fight against a 
police raid. And more recently, hate crimes committed against LGBTQ individuals at 
nightclubs have been documented like the 201 4 case of a man setting fire to a Seattle 
nightclub because of his hatred of gays and lesbians (Carter 201 4 ). Regardless of the 
perpetrator's motive, the violence witnessed at Pulse fit entirely too well into the 
collective memory of the LGBTQ community. 
While the attack on Pulse brought kind words and reaffirmations of support for 
the LGBTQ community from world leaders, politicians. and activists (Chan 201 6; 
Garunay 201 6; Hunt and Jones 201 6), an unusually impassioned response came from 
some unlikely sorts: conservatives. While many criticisms were levied at right-wing 
religious leaders' reactions to the shooting (Bever 201 6) and the nwnber of Republican 
Congressmen leaving out the LGBTQ community in their remarks about Pulse (Weigel 
201 6), some on the right were much more explicit in both their mention and support for 
the LGBTQ community. 
Notably, then-candidate Donald Trump made specific overtures to the queer 
community in his first presidential campaign rally following the shooting. stating: "We 
want to live in a country where gay and lesbian Americans and all Americans are safe 
from radical lslam, which, by the way, wants to murder and has murdered gays and they 
enslave women" (Corasaniti 201 6). Trump doubled down on these remarks in his 
2 The queer community and the various mafias had a curious rapport with one another 
during this time, as the mafias could pay off police officers to ward off potential raids on 
their establishments. allowing the LGBTQ community a place of somewhat more security 
than other establishments they would otherwise attend. 
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nomination acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention - only a few 
weeks after the Pulse shooting - declaring: "As your president, J will do everything in  my 
power to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful 
foreign ideology" (Johnson 2016). These remarks were historic in that Trump became the 
first Republjcan presidential nominee to offer words of support for the LGBTQ 
community in a nomination acceptance speech. 
Yet. Trump was not the only vocal and visible member of the right to comment on 
the Pulse shooting. the queer community. and radical Islamic terrorism. The alt-right3 and 
gay provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos wrote an article for the right-wing media outlet 
Breitbart the day of the attack titled "The Left Chose Islam Over Gays, Now 100 People 
Are Dead or Maimed in Orlando'" ( Yiannopoulos 2016). Meanwhile, other neo-Nazi and 
historically homophobic individuals and organizations began spreading Islamophobic 
messages of support for the LGBTQ community (Falvey 2016). The overt critiques of 
Islam in the comments of Trump. Yiannopoulos. and others on the right cannot be 
understated. for they represent one of the most singular ties between traditionally 
homophobic and transphobic groups. and segments of the LGBTQ community. 
The increasing political science literature investigating sexuality politics has 
provided many critical insights into the community. Several studies have highlighted that 
the majority of the LGBTQ community has traditionally voted Democratic and generally 
identify as liberal (Black et al 2000; Lewis et al 2011; Perrella et al 2012; Schnabel 2018; 
3 The term "alt-right" was popularized by one the movement"s founders and leading 
members Richard Spencer. While still somewhat loosely understood, the alt-right is 
generally understood to be those supporting far-right nationalistic, white supremacist, and 
anti-Semitic politics (Stack 2018). 
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Sherrill 1996). Other research has considered the interactions of LGBTQ rights issues on 
both general and LGBTQ-specific voting behavior (Abramowitz 2004; Hi l lygus and 
Shields 2005; Lewis 2005; Mulligan 2008; Smith et al 2006). However, due often to data 
limitations on the political ideologies, thoughts, and behaviors of the community. and the 
generally nascent and sometimes zeitgeist-focused nature of sexuality politics, research 
on the LGBTQ community has sometimes been l imited in scope and purpose. Too often, 
LGBTQ individuals are treated as variables in social science research instead of being the 
focus of said research - or, as this study seeks to underscore. the community is treated as 
a monolith in our general and academic discussions. 
Thus, when seeking to better understand the political beliefs of the LGBTQ 
community. it is necessary to dig beyond first-order questions typified by simple 
descriptive studies. Exploring queer conservatism is one route to this goal. Queer politics 
has not been immune to the growing tides of far-right fascination, populism, and 
nationalism over at least the past decade. Research is beginning to note what this tide 
looks like and how it is impacting broader politics (Bakker et al 2016; Bonikowski 2016; 
Snyder 2003). Evidenced by Trump. Yiannopoulos, and others to be expanded upon. 
many on the right are evolving their stances on sexuality issues for their political gain, 
and the queer community is doing just the same. Queer conservatism is particularly 
fascinating due to its intersection with beliefs often seen by the mainstream LGBTQ 
community as antithetical to their rights. Additionally, queer conservatism presents a 
newer and pronounced usage of one's sexuality as a vehicle for politicaJ expression. and 
the greater complexity with which queer conservatism shades ongoing explorations of 
far-right populism and nationalism. 
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Yet, most importantly. better understanding queer conservatism allows for a better 
understanding of the queer community. This community is notably one of the most 
diverse minority communities with its many intersections of multiple sexualities and 
genders, as well as racial, class. and certainly ideological distinctions (Ferris 2006). 
Obviously, queer conservatism has always existed. However. as will be argued in this 
study, even after the founding of conservative LGBTQ political organizations like the 
Log Cabin Republicans in 1978 (the first specifically-conservative LGBTQ political 
organization in the United States; "Our History") or GOProud in 2009 (a slightly more 
conservative organization than the LCRs; Zeller 20 l 0). queer conservatism has largely 
been left out of both political science and historiographical surveys of the LGBTQ 
community. 
Another justification comes from the political power held by the LGBTQ 
community and the conservatives within. As Gates (2012) explains in his report for the 
Williams Institute at UCLA. the 2012 LGBTQ vote was I ikely enough to swing the 
election in favor of President Obama. as the LGBTQ vote in Ohio and Florida - key 
swing states - appeared enough to push those states into Obama·s corner. This 
importance is magnified considering 27% of the LGBTQ community voted for .John 
McCain in the 2008 election (Huang et al 2016 ). Moreover. Donald Trump received only 
14% of the LGBT vote - the lowest vote share among Republican nominees since 1992 
(Huang et al. 2016). At face value. it appears Trump·s historic inclusion of LGBTQ 
rights in his platform and rhetoric did not help him gain votes from the LGBTQ 
population. 
Combining President Trump's historically low vote share among the queer 
community with the rise of more radically nationalist members exemplifies the need to 
better understand this segment of the LGBTQ community. Thus, this research proposes 
most simply the question: "What does queer conservatism look like?" Even though the 
question may be simplistic, the routes to answering are anything but. 
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To answer, this study is designed as follows: first, queer conservatism as an 
ideology is dissected, highlighting the differences between traditional and newer 
narratives; next findings from quantitative analysis using the 2016 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study are discussed: then, theories of homonationalism are 
offered for greater context and exploration; and finally, broader discussions surrounding 
the research question and data are presented. 
A note on source material is important to include. While the foundational research 
for this study comes from scholarly works, many other sources come from news articles, 
video interviews published on YouTube. and other less traditional arenas. Because an 
examination of queer conservatism requires research on the fast-changing nature of this 
LGBTQ subgroup. and because this subgroup is one not yet frequently explored by 
political scientists or other scholars in published works, research outside of traditional 
areas of scholarship is both necessary and important. Every effort has been made to 
include reputable news and media outlets, and to approach even biased sources from an 
objective standpoint. 
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UNDERSTANDING QUEER CONSERVATISM 
To begin exploring the politics of the LGBTQ right, i t  is important first to 
establish understood definitions. The ideologies discussed in this work are based more in 
contemporary understandings of conservatism. Focuses on tradition and hierarchy. law­
and-order, largely Christian oriented, and a heavy importance placed on small 
governments are at the root of these ideologies (Schneider 2009). While conservatism in  
America is  very diverse with deviations like morality-centered Christian conservatives. 
and so-called Country Club Republicans focused mostly on low taxes, fewer regulations. 
and a generally pro-business approach to politics, there are two distinct branches of 
conservatism found within the queer community: neoconservatism and 
paleoconservatism, or what may be more broadly understood as nationalism and the 
ideology most often employed by the alt-right. 
Neoconservatism is often defined by spreading traditional American democracy 
around the globe and places a greater importance on US foreign affairs (VaYsse 2010 ). 
Paleoconservatism is broadly understood as those conservatives concerned with the 
protection of a Western identity through greater economic and political nationalism. a 
restriction on immigration. and a central focus on traditional social policies and norms 
formulated around religious. ethnic, and national identities (Foley 2007). Scaling back 
US mil itary intervention abroad often is also encapsulated in paleoconservatism. seen 
through many in the Tea Party (Skocpol and Will iamson 2013). 
Just as these splits exist among mainstream conservatism. so too do they occur 
within queer conservatism. Thus. in this exploration of queer conservatism. this section 
seeks first to trace the political foundations and evolutions of conservatism within the 
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queer community. This section will also place the evolutions and ideologies of the queer 
right into a broader frame found within general treatments of the LGBTQ rights 
movement and its political organizations. Understandably. because the majority of 
LGBTQ people lean towards more liberal ideologies, much of the history and political 
treatment of the rights movement has focused more on the primarily left-leaning 
organizations like the Human Rights Campaign. Freedom to Marry. the Gay Liberation 
Front, and the Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (Faderman 2015; Stryker 2017). 
Political differences among left-leaning queer rights groups have existed since 
even the early Homophile movement of the 1950s. Historians and political scientists have 
noted this distinction as being assimilationist versus liberationist (Faderman 2015: 
Rimmerman 2002; Rimmerman 2008). It is exactly this frame. assimilation or liberation. 
which can be applied also to the politics and organizations of the queer right. 
Rimrnerman (2008) summarizes assimilationist LGBTQ politics as stressing the 
inherent sameness of queer and straight people. Put another way. the only difference 
between gay and straight America is the gender of one· s romantic and/or sexual 
partner(s). Moreover, as society generally better understands that sexuality exists on a 
spectrum. this difference is barely one at all. Huntington (2015) perhaps best exemplifies 
the assimilationist narrative through her dissection of the same-sex marriage fight 
culminating in legalization via the Supreme Court case Oberge_fell , .. Hodges: just like 
heterosexual relationships. same-gender relationships are loving. committed 
relationships. and same-gender couples possess the same ability as heterosexual couples 
to raise their children. 
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Conversely. liberationist thinking argues for the acceptance of queer people as a 
distinct cultural minority. Whaf s more. liberationists identify the most important political 
struggle as against heteronormativit/ rather than only fighting for civil equality among 
queer and straight society. This struggle stems from the belief that queer culture cannot 
exist under straight society so Jong as heteronormativity dominates our norms and politics 
(Rimmerman 2008). To simplify. liberationists advocate an accepted difference i n  society 
akin to, though not exactly like, distinctions of race or gender. 
Due to the longer history of the LGBTQ rights movement based primarily on the 
left. it i s  understandable that the assimilationist and liberationist frame has been well 
established in LGBTQ scholarship. Yet, as will be discussed in greater detail below, 
recent evolutions within queer conservative thinking also fit within this frame. Thus. if 
we are to understand queer conservatism. it is crucial to understand the ways in which a 
queer person's sexuality intersects with. informs. and impacts their politics. 
Naturally. this intersection yields different results for different people. So. in 
seeking to better understand the politics of queer conservatism, it is necessary to trace 
this ideology from the first and largest conservative LGBTQ organization. the Log Cabin 
Republicans (hereafter '"LCRs'"). then turn to the rising levels of right-wing nationalist 
and white supremacist thinking (aka '·alt-right" thinking) present in queer conservatism. 
4 Schilt and Westbrook define heteronormativity as ""the suite of cultural. legal, and 
institutional practices that maintain normative assumptions that there are two and only 
two genders. that gender reflects biological sex. and that only sexual attraction between 
these ·opposite· genders is natural or acceptable·· (2009. 441). 
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The Log Cabin Republicans and Mainstream Queer Conservatism 
As noted above. queer conservatism can generally be understood in two 
camps - neoconservatism and paleoconservatism. The largest and most pervasive 
version of queer conservatism is rooted i n  neoconservatism and the conservative 
wave introduced by President Reagan. Take. for example. Guy Benson. a frequent 
commentator on Fox News and political editor of the conservative webpage and 
magazine Townhall. Benson argues that his sexuality is only one facet of his 
personhood. and that he cares more about traditionally conservative values like a 
small government. defense of the free market. and a strong mil i tary than he does 
about defining h is  politics solely on LGBTQ issues ( PragerU 20 1 8 ). This argument 
is one believed and employed by similar LGBTQ conservative thinkers and 
commentators like Dave Rubin, entrepreneur Peter Thiel. and President of the Log 
Cabin Republicans Gregory T. Angelo (Drabold 20 1 6; Lloyd 20 1 6: Riley 20 1 7) .  
I t  i s  through the Log Cabin Republicans that classical queer conservatism can best 
be understood. As their website explains, the LCRs began as a fledgling group of gay 
conservatives opposed to what became known as the Briggs Initiative ('"Our History"'). 
Officially known as California Proposition 6, the Initiative. spearheaded by California 
state senator John Briggs, was a 1978 California referendum which. if passed. would 
have banned gays and lesbians from teaching in public schools and would have al lowed 
for the firing of any teacher found to be advocating for or supportive of gay and lesbian 
people (Rimmerman 2002). The initiative came in the wake of general backlash against 
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the LGBTQ rights movement when many in the wider public believed exposing children 
to homosexuals could cause the kids to become gay. or that they may contract HIV I AIDS 
(Griffin and Ouellett 2003).  As the LCRs note, initial polling on the initiative showed the 
Proposition favored 61 % to 31 % ("Our History"). Due to the hesitancy of many 
Californian Republicans and Democrats to fight the issue. many gay conservatives, gay 
liberals like Harvey Milk, and their allies rose to the challenge (McKinley 2008). 
Specifically, gay conservatives in California chose to lobby key policy elites like 
former Governor and Presidential-hopeful Ronald Reagan. After successful lobbying 
efforts, Reagan wrote a November 151 editorial in the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner 
lambasting the Proposition. saying it '·is not needed to protect our children,'' and, "it has 
the potential for real mischief. What if an overwrought youngster. disappointed by bad 
grades, imagined it was the teacher"s fault and struck out by accusing the teacher of 
advocating homosexuality? Innocent lives could be ruined .. (Reagan 1978. 19). 
Due to the efforts of these gay activists. Republican and Democrat alike. several 
political elites, like Reagan. rallied against the Proposition including former President 
Ford. then-Governor Jerry Brown. and eventually. then-President Carter (LeVay and 
Nonas 1997). As a result. instead of the Proposition passing 61-31. it failed 58-41. with 
over a million more Californians voting against the Initiative (School Employees 1 978). 
In response. those gay conservatives officially formed the Log Cabin Republicans (''Our 
History .. ). 
Since their inception and subsequent growth, the LCRs have focused on 
traditionally conservative ideals. As they explain, .. Log Cabin Republicans are LGBT 
Republicans and straight allies who support equality under the law for all. free markets, 
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individual liberty. limited government. and a strong national defense" ("About Us.'). 
Additionally, they note that the LCRs ''believe equality for LGBT Americans is in the 
finest tradition of the Republican Party.'' They "educate (their] Party about why inclusion 
wins. Opposing LGBT equality is inconsistent with the GO P's core principles of smaller 
government and personal freedom:· In 2012. the LCRs boasted 45.000 members an<l 44 
chapters (Shapiro 2012� recent membership numbers have proven very difficult to find, 
as the LCRs do not usually publicize these figures). 
The LCR fight for both traditional Republican values and the inclusion of 
LGBTQ rights within the Republican Party has led the organization to many battles 
largely within the Republican Party. The LCRs· next major battle post-Briggs Initiative 
came after Pat Buchanan· s 1992 ''culture war'' speech at the Republican National 
Convention. ln response to Buchanan's statements disparaging LGBTQ rights in what he 
called .. a fight for the soul of America" (Buchanan 1992), and responding more generally 
to President George H. W. Bush· s loss in 1992. the LC Rs increased both their lobbying 
efforts and their attempts to unify the Republican party around a winning strategy ("Our 
History .. ). 
It was at this point when the operationalization of the LCRs' politics became 
increasingly succinct. Throughout the 1990s, the LCRs attempted to make in-roads with 
the Republican establishment. As the LCRs claim. their efforts led to many Republican 
lawmakers and elites such as Governor George Pataki of New York. Los Angeles Mayor 
Richard Riordan and New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani becoming "leading voices of 
inclusion and liberty'· ( .. Our History''). However. their efforts during this decade are 
notably more complicated than the organization claims. 
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The LGBTQ rights struggle during the 1 990s is often painted as one facing 
intense backlash against not only the general rights movement but broader social equality 
movements as well (Faderman 2015). The strengthening of the Religious Right over the 
course of the 1 980s into the 1 990s led to the sort of ·'culture war'· described by Buchanan 
(Rimmerman 2008). So, to continue increasing their leverage within the party, the LCRs· 
leadership disavowed as well as they could the stereotypical image of the gay community 
during those decades. 
As Rogers and Lott (1997) explain, it's unsurprising that throughout the LCRs· 
lobbying Republican elites. the organization frequently drew ''sharp rhetorical boundaries 
between themselves and those individuals deemed part of the ·gay establishment" or 
associated with libertine l ifestyles, queer theory. or direct action. confrontational politics·· 
(500). This shirking of the image of the sexually liberal and radical gay was seen as an 
advantage by many in the LCRs during the '90s. One president of the Los Angeles club 
noted. ·'when [other Republicans] see that we· re sitting at the table and not wearing 
leather jockstraps, their whole image of gays and lesbians will shift" (Rogers and Lott 
1 997, 500). In  a similar vein are the remarks of Andy Smith, president of the Austin. 
Texas club, emphasizing that the LCRs ·'have to educate people that we are not left-wing. 
earring-wearing liberals" (Rogers and Lott 1997. 500). And another member of the 
LCRs. Jesse Walters, remarked "I think [campaign officials] were afraid we were going 
to be a crowd of radical leather men or drag queens"' (Rogers and Lott 1 997, 500-501 ). 
The LCRs appeared to have gained even greater victories for inclusiveness 
during the early 2000s and the election of President George W. Bush. As they note. then­
candidate Bush met with a group of gay conservatives. expressed his admiration for 
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hearing their stories, and the LCRs note the lack of anti-gay rhetoric in the 2000 general 
election ("Our History"). Moreover, President Bush's 2003 announcement of a$ l 5 
billion commitment to combat the global AIDS epidemic was celebrated by the LCRs 
("Our History''). Others have noted. however. that Bush's announcement coincided 
coincidentally with the launching of the Iraq war (Dietrich 2007), and that the President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PREPF AR, included stipulations that up to a third of 
the $15 billion be reserved for abstinence-only prevention, a method discouraged by 
doctors and activists involved in the global AIDS epidemic (Cohen 2007). Regardless, 
Bush's launching of PREPFAR was seen as a victory among the LCRs. the LGBTQ 
right, and the broader queer community. 
While the early years of President Bush's first term appeared somewhat fruitful 
for the LCRs' mission. by 2003 the optimism smTounding the compassionate 
conservative·s agenda faded. In June 2003. The US Supreme Court struck down Texas· 
sodomy law in the Lawrence v. Texas case. overturning the Court's 1 986 ruling 
upholding Georgia's similar law in Bowers v. Hardwick (Spindelman 2004). And, in 
2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health that the state's civil marriage laws could not discriminate based on sex. making 
Massachusetts the first state in the country to legalize same-sex marriage (Wegman 
2015). Despite these monumental gains for the LGBTQ community, the public and 
political backlash was swift. 
Even before the Lawrence and Goodridge cases, social conservatives sought a 
constitutional amendment defining marriage as being strictly between a man and a 
woman (Rimmerman 2008). As the LCRs describe. though President Bush sidestepped 
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the issue of marriage equality and a constitutional amendment in the initial months 
following these high-profile rulings, his appointment of very conservative federal judges 
1 ike the recess appointment of anti-gay Alabama Attorney General Wi Iii am Pryor made it 
clear that Bush would endorse the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA; "Our History"). 
He did just that in February 2004. 
instead of applying a purely "sameness" argument or arguing about the inherent 
nature of same-gender relationships, the LCRs criticized the FMA on what they believed 
are tenants of the Republican Party: a focus on federalism, state autonomy, and liberty 
("Our History"). In response to the Amendment, the LCRs launched a $ 1  million 
lobbying and advertising campaign ( .. Our History"). With that funding, the LCRs 
conducted a national opinion poll to measure public attitudes about civil unions, same­
sex marriage. and the proposed FMA. Their data culminated in  an advertising campaign 
with a television ad featuring Vice President Cheney's rejection of a federal marriage 
amendment at the 2000 Vice Presidential Debate, and targeted lawmakers in Washington 
D.C. and key states in 2004 like Missouri, Ohio. Florida. Arizona. and Texas. 
Gauging the LCRs· impact on the FMA debate is difficult. Despite spending over 
$ 1  million on the issue and claiming that the House and Senate '"overwhelmingly 
rejected'' the amendments ("Our History"). the final vote tally was 227 to 1 86 in the 
House (short of the 290 needed; Musgrave 2004) and 50 against to 48 in favor in the 
Senate (shy of the 60 votes needed; Allard 2004). Even though the FMA was defeated. 
the debate would prove highly divisive not only for the nation, but for the LCRs as welt. 
In what was called by many pundits a "referendum on values" (Mulligan 2008, 
1 09). the 2004 General Election was the first major outlet for public backlash against 
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LGBTQ rights post-Lawrence and Goodridge. While the impact of moral issues like 
abortion and same-sex marriage has been contextualized and lessened by scholars since 
the 2004 election (Abramowitz 2004; Hil lygus and Shields 2005), the electoral outcomes 
were clear. 1 l states ratified marriage amendments to their state constitutions, and 
President Bush won reelection (Smith et al 2006). Just as the nation was divided on the 
question of same-sex marriage, so were the LC Rs. For the first time since the 1992 
Presidential Election, the LCRs voted not to endorse the Republican candidate (Anderson 
2004). 
Withholding their support for President Bush ·s re-election did not keep the LC Rs 
from continuing their mission of changing attitudes both within and outside of the 
Republican Party. In 2008, the LCRs endorsed John McCain in that year·s General 
Election largely because of his opposition to the FMA. and they endorsed Romney in 
2012 (Jacobson 2008; '·With Endorsement" 2012). The LCRs defended their 
endorsement of anti-LGBTQ Romney over President Obama. who had by 2012 expressed 
his support for same-sex marriage. by emphasizing the '·gravity of the economic and 
national security issues currently at stake." The LC Rs also noted in the press release of 
their endorsement their optimism would eventually support the pro-LGBTQ Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act (Shapiro 2012). 
In 2016. the LCR leadership decided not to endorse any candidate. though their 
President Gregory T. Angelo has been very supportive of President Trump since his 
victory. with Angelo describing Trump as "the most pro-LGBT Republican president in 
history'· (Signorile 2018). This move has understandably been met with some ire. as 
President Trump has proposed a ban on transgender Americans serving openly in the 
armed forces and many in his cabinet like Secretary of Education Betsy De Vos and 
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar have invoked religious liberty 
arguments allowing the denial of service to individuals with beliefs or l ifestyles which 
may go against one's religious beliefs - moves deeply concerning to the queer 
community (Signorile 20 I 7). 
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Notably. the LCRs have consistently employed much more centrist politics than 
others in the Party. Rogers and Lott ( 1 997) note that from the early days of the 
organization. the LCRs have professed the guiding Republican principles of a free market 
economy. individual liberties, and strong foreign policy. Rogers and Lott also add that. 
despite the "big tent" nature of the GOP and their claimed inclusiveness of multiple 
viewpoints. the LCRs have frequently and understandably been at odds with the Christian 
Right. Though the LCRs have never explicitly called the religious right their enemies, 
they obviously share political differences. Moreover. in 2004. then political director of 
the LCRs Patrick Guerriero stressed to other LCR members the importance of attending 
the 2004 Republican National Convention (even though they did not endorse President 
Bush) because they needed to "make it clear that we are loyal Republicans.'' Guerriero 
also saw the convention as an opportunity to show both the GOP and the country that 
there are "thoughtful. conservative gay Republicans.'' Yet. Guerriero also noted that if 
they do not do so . .. the far right will be able to claim it as their convention" (Anderson 
2 004). 
This centrism is evident also in the LCRs· approach to high-profile LGBTQ 
issues throughout their existence. While the LCRs state their core principles are those of 
the Republican party - a focus on individual liberties. small government. free market 
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capitalism, and a strong national defense - their lobbying and political efforts exist in a 
gray area between advocating staunchly for these principles while also taking actions 
more in the traditional center. Take the issue leading to the LCRs' founding, the Briggs 
Initiative. The entire basis for the LCRs' opposition to the law potentially banning 
LGBTQ people from teaching was a privacy argument and individual liberties argument: 
LGBTQ people are perfectly fit to be teachers, and what they do outside of the school 
walls isn't relevant to their professional ability. This argument can easily be interpreted 
as a classically conservative. civil liberties interpretation of one's right to privacy. 
Yet, two of the most important LGBTQ issues of the 2151 century. Don·t Ask. 
Don't Tell (DADT) and the Obergefell v. Hodges case legalizing same-sex marriage, 
highlight how the LCRs have often moved to more centrist politics. The LCRs 
successfully argued before the federal courts i n  20 I 0 that DADT violated queer service 
members· First Amendment rights to free expression and Fifth Amendment rights to due 
process (Schwartz 20 I 0). Additionally. the LCRs' partner think tank Liberty Education 
Forum filed an amicus brief for the Obergefell v. Hodges case arguing that san1e-sex 
marriage should be legalized not on the "sameness" argument of same-sex loving 
relationships and parenting as was commonly argued. Instead. Liberty Education Forum 
used discrimination evident in spousal exemptions in campaign donation Jaws - Jaws like 
Citizens United which conservative Justices at the time Alito, Thomas. and Scalia 
supported - to demonstrate existing discrimination against LGBTQ partners (Nelson 
2015). 
To be sure. the LCRs approach to these legal challenges fit within the Republican 
frame. Their challenge to DADT was one of furthering constitutional protections for 
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queer service members, and the Liberty Education Forum· s brief challenged the Supreme 
Court to apply the decisions it had made to every partnership. hetero or homosexual. 
However, the DADT challenge also fits squarely within the "'sameness'· narrative offered 
by many left-leaning LGBTQ organizations, and the Liberty Education Forum decided to 
make their campaign donation argument to separate them from so many others making 
"sameness" arguments for same-sex marriage and parenting rights. a position they and 
the LCRs agreed with (Nelson 2015). 
Yet, at its core, these challenges, as well as the LCRs' commitment to lobbying 
Republican elites and attempting to change the party from the inside underscore how the 
operationalization of a group's mission may differ from the ideological core they 
espouse. The LCRs challenged DADT and marriage discrimination in the courts. Many 
others on the right, especially religious conservatives. have lambasted the Supreme Court 
and other federal and state courts as being fil led with activist judges creating social 
change without the consent of the democratic populace - though it should be noted these 
criticisms have been levied against conservative Supreme Court Justices as well (Young 
2002; Schaller 2009). Much of the 2151 century queer rights struggle has been fought in 
the courts instead of solely through lobbying or changing public opinion (Faderman 
2015). In fighting for greater LGBTQ rights via higher cou11s. the LCRs have often left 
behind their focus on small government and states· rights in favor of sweeping change 
augmenting the civil rights of their queer constituency. 
Finally, the LCRs have frequently been at odds with the Republican Pa11y's 
platform. Despite positive words about President Trump from LCR President Gregory T. 
Angelo and Trump's remarks at the 2016 Republican National Convention (Johnson 
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2016), the Republican Party adopted many anti-LGBTQ planks to its 201 6  platform 
including reaffirming marriage between a man and a woman, loosely supporting so-called 
"conversion therapy'' for queer youth. and doubling down on discrimination against 
transgender people through the .. bathroom bill" debates (Peters 201 8). Moreover, the 
LCRs have frequently taken a neutral position on other hot button social issues like 
abortion (''Log Cabin·· 1 999; Shapiro 20 I 2a). 
This centrism has placed the LCRs in the crosshairs of queer conservatism. In 
2009. Christopher R. Barron. then-national political director of the LCRs, and Jimmy 
LaSilva. then-director of programs and policy for the same group. left the Log Cabin to 
form GO Proud. an organization of queer Republicans disillusioned with the centrism of 
the LCRs (McGum 2009). Although GOProud folded in 20 I 4. the group represented an 
important split from the LCRs, who had previously dominated queer right representation. 
GO Proud represented a number of queer conservatives who believed that advocating for 
stricter tax relief and employing a similar ideology to the rising tide of Tea Party 
conservatism would aid both America and specifically the queer community (Shapiro 
2012b). 
Additionally. GOProud viewed the LCRs· platform as too focused on social 
issues like same-sex marriage. GO Proud was supportive of same-sex marriage. but 
believed it to be a matter only for the states to decide. going against the more national 
focus of the LC Rs (Zeller 2010). Moreover. whereas the LC Rs have traditionally not 
taken a stance on other social issues like abortion. GOProud was staunchly pro-life 
(McGurn 2009). However. beyond a more state-level focused politics and some 
deviations on policy. GOProud did not have many grand splits with the LCR. Yet. despite 
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GOProud's relatively short existence, the organization was arguably the first among the 
queer right to break away from assimilationist, elite-focused actions of the LC Rs. For 
these reasons. GOProud was an important blip and an even more important precursor to 
what would soon follow. 
Tile Queer Far-Right and LGBTQ Politics 
Shakespeare ·s adage "misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows·· is perhaps 
one of the most apt ways to approach queer individuals on the far right and their 
relationship with traditionally homophobic, transphobic, and nationalistic organizations. 
If one were to update Shakespeare's words. the phrase may go something like '"terrorism 
acquaints a man with strange bedfellows;' for it is almost entirely around the issue of 
radical Islamic terrorism that recent evolutions in queer conservatism is found. This 
exploration into the nationalistic evolutions among queer conservatives begins with a few 
caveats. 
First, because voices among the radical right in queer politics have only recently 
gained attention on the mainstream level. finding and understanding their beliefs is a bit 
difficult. Additionally. the queer far-right is a small subset of an already small subset of 
the LGBTQ population. It is likely anywhere between 20 and 30 percent of queer people 
identify as conservative (Huang et al 2016). In 20 1 7. GaJlup released updated numbers on 
the American LGBTQ population, estimating 4.3% of adults. or 1 0  million Americans. 
identify as LGBTQ. Thus. combining these numbers with voting data places the 
estimated queer conservative population between 2 and 3 million Americans. 
Yet, despite their size and a lack of hard data on this group, they are nonetheless 
important to examine. for the queer alt-right contextualizes both queer and straight 
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politics. What's more, the performance of one·s sexuality in the political sphere within 
the queer far-right is as novel as it is important. So, this section will explain the queer far­
right through the lens of some of its most impo11ant, popular, and impactful practitioners. 
Pinning down the specifics of the queer far-right is admittedly difficult. As 
elements of the far-right like the alt-right have risen and popularized. the definition of the 
alt-right has changed as it has solidified. As the Anti-Defamation League explain, core 
tenants of the alt-right specifically include racism and anti-Semitism ("From Alt Right"). 
However, as the alt-right and its leaders like Richard Spencer rose to prominence, many 
who are not necessarily racist or anti-Semitic subscribed to the ideology because they 
viewed it as the anti-establishment conservative group. Lucian Wintrich. a prominent far­
right gay journalist and White House correspondent for the Gateway Pundit. has 
expressed such beliefs and how he and others like Milo Yiannopoulos no longer associate 
with the alt-right. Instead, they fall under the category of "alt-lite"' ( .. From Alt Righf'). 
The major difference between the alt-right and alt-lite is that. in the words of alt­
right writer and white supremacist Greg .Johnson . .. The alt-lite is defined by civic 
nationalism as opposed to racial nationalism" ("From Alt Right'l This distinction, while 
often difficult to nail down amongst far-right nationalists, is important to understand 
because the queer far-right exists in both camps. Lucian Wintrich and Milo Yiannopoulos 
are perhaps the most popular gay members of the alt-lite. whereas writers and activists 
like James J. O'Meara and Jack Donovan are popular among the white nationalist alt­
right (Minkowitz 201 7). 
Regardless of differing beliefs on creating an American or Western ethnostate, the 
queer far-right shares far more in common than they do disagreements. Opposition to 
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immigration and Islamic extremism are strong features of this ideology (Minkowitz 
2017).  Additionally. many in the queer far-right take great issue with identity politics and 
political correctness. Indeed, so-called PC culture is Yiannopoulos' biggest target. 
Moreover, many in these camps. instead of labeling themselves as conservative, alt-right, 
or alt-lite, often don the term .. cultural libertarian·' (Rubin Report 201 5). This ideology is 
often defined by the belief that people should be free from the dictates of cultural norms, 
thus explaining why issues of political correctness and ideologies challenged generally 
accepted power structures are seen as threatening. Shirking commonly understood or 
mainstream ideological monikers is another facet of both queer and general alt-right or 
alt-lite ideals. 
Part of this phenomenon can be explained by the inherent anti-establishment 
nature of these far-right groups. However. when looking specifically to queer people in 
these spaces. the fluidity among these political ideals becomes starker. Yiannopoulos, 
while never being one to specifically label himself part of the alt-lite, expresses the exact 
views shared by the group. Moreover. Yiannopoulos has stated that his biggest concerns 
are about pop culture and free speech. but has said the only reason he talks politics is 
because of President Trump (Stein 201 6). And in 2016. Lucian Wintrich rose to 
prominence over his controversial photoshoot '·Twinks4Trump" which featured scantily 
clad. young gay men wearing Trump's '"Make America Great Again'· hats (Sopelsa 
2017). 
Discussing the ideologies of far-right queer conservatives is important. but l argue 
not crucial to understanding the significance and novelty of those like Yiannopoulos and 
Wintrich. Just as mainstream conservative queer people have always existed, so too have 
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those LGBTQ people more far-right inclined. What is new, different. and telling is the 
way many on the far-right utilize their sexuality as a political tool. Moreover. their using 
their sexuality as a distinct part of their politics is akin to liberationist thinking as 
discussed above. 
Earlier. I noted that the assimilationist and l iberationist frame has been widely 
employed through both historical and political accounts of the tension among the queer 
left. Such a tension. though more than likely there in some form. has never been this 
explicit on the queer right. The Log Cabin Republicans have always fit squarely within 
the assimilationist camp. By arguing for sameness and equality in civil law while also 
placing great importance on looking or acting nothing like the stereotypical libertine gay. 
the LCRs from their founding to present day have employed the same political tactics as 
the assimilationist. mainstream queer left (Rogers and Lott 1 997; Signorile 201 8). Put 
another way. the LCRs believe they are already in the .. big tent" and are only trying to 
make it that much bigger. 
Conversely, the queer far-right see themselves as more anti-establishment. The 
very fact that they use titles like alt-right and alt-lite instead of Republican is just one 
indication. Moreover. they frequently use their sexuality as justification and as a tool for 
their politics. Yiannopoulos has criticized same-sex marriage not with a religious 
argument or one seeking to maintain the social hierarchy of heterosexual marriage. 
Instead. Yiannopoulos has been against same-sex marriage because to him. being queer is 
a license to break away from the mainstream and live a freer lifestyle (Rubin Report 
2015). Or in other words. Yiannopoulos argues for queerness. free speech. and free 
society as a place for gay people to live outside of heteronormative assumptions. Rather 
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than advocating for LGBTQ people·s strict inclusion i n  society. Yiannopoulos and others 
view their queerness as defining their personhood and politics. and because society in  
many ways still etherizes the LGBTQ community. queer people have greater freedom to 
explore l ife, politics, and interactions with society in ways traditionally associated with 
being abnormal. 
Lucian Wintrich also serves as an example of using one· s sexuality to advocate 
for conservative politics. Wintrich is a staunch Trump supporter and free speech advocate 
who gained his notoriety through the controversial and highly sexualized 
"Twinks4Trump" photoshoot, a photoshoot he was later fired for (VICE News 201 7). 
Instead of featuring gay men in the classic suit and tie - in other words, Log Cabin 
Republicans - Wintrich uses blatant queer overtones to advocate a political message. It is 
in the performance and operationalization of the queer far-right" s politics that place them 
very much in the vein of liberationism. 
The debates between assimilationism and liberationism on the left have largely 
defined how the LGBTQ rights struggle has operated (Rimmerman 2008). Whether it be 
the assimilationists lobbying political elites for change or fighting most of the legal battle 
in the courts, or the liberationists using more direct-action protest tactics. the history of 
the LGBTQ rights movement in the United States has exemplified the success of 
assimilationist tactics (Faderman 2015 .  What remains to be seen now is the ways in 
which the queer far-right and their more liberationist anti-establishment views play out 
their political struggle. The LCRs have made inroads within the GOP through their 
lobbying efforts and they played a key role in overturning DADT through their legal 
challenge. Yet. the nascence of the queer far-right leaves more questions than predictions. 
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It is important to point out that. o�jectively. the LCRs helped open the door for queer 
people·s acceptance in the far-right. However. because of the far-right's anti­
establishment beliefs, there is much tension between the queer far-right and mainstream 
queer conservatives beyond core policy priorities. 
The similarities between the queer liberationist left and right cxi::;t onJy in the 
ways they frame their sexuality as political and treat the idea of queer existence in 
society. The liberationist left like the Gay Liberation Front emerged during the explosive 
rise of the gay rights movement after the Stonewall Riots in 1 969, and their main cause 
was queer liberation (Faderman 2015). The ideological priorities of the queer far-right are 
tied much more to their general political beliefs than on a single issue like civil 
protections. The alt-right and similar organizations only began courting likeminded queer 
conservatives after the Obergefell v. Hodges case legalizing same-sex marriage in 201 5  
("Youth .. 2015). Simply put. the queer far-right has risen more so after the major rights 
battles were won. So. while the queer far-right's main political objectives may not be 
solely about LGBTQ politics. they do benefit from a smaller barrier to entry and a far­
right movement whose leaders at least want them in the fold. 
Finally. because so much of the queer far-right's politics are wrapped in the 
current wave of populist nationalism. the movement generally has suffered growing 
pains. The split between the alt-right and the alt-lite underscores the instability still 
somewhat prevalent among this wing of conservatives. How long the nationalist 
mentality will exist in American politics is unknown. The important question when 
thinking about the LGBTQ people in the far-right is whether their sexual politics will 
evolve as nativist debates continue raging, and if they will linger or change entirely 
when/if the nationalistic pendulum swings the other way? 
3 1  
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DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Analyzing the rhetoric and purported beliefs of queer conservatives is only one 
way to explore the range of political thought among this subgroup. Quantitative analysis 
of their demographic breakdowns and political opinions helps complete the picture. In 
this section, I will utilize the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The CCES 
dataset from 2016 provides a unique insight into the LGBTQ community, as its inclusion 
of sexual orientation and gender identity questions lends a sample of 5,1 1 7  self-identified 
LGBTQ people out of the 64,600 respondents. This sample is one of the largest ever of 
queer people, allowing for statistical validity when one moves beyond simple 
demographic measures of the community. Until the 2016 CCES data, most quantitative 
studies surveying LGBTQ people's politics either had samples not large enough to move 
confidently beyond first-order questions and/or they did not include transgender 
respondents (Black et al 2000; Gates 20 1 1 ;  Lewis et al 201 1 ; Sherrill 1996). 
Therefore, the 2016 CCES set is useful, important, and insightful as researchers 
establish a more up-to-date picture of the LGBTQ community (specifically the 
conservatives) and make inferences about queer conservatism. This section begins with a 
description of the methods used, starting first with demographic data of both the general 
LGBTQ population and the queer conservative sample, then reports political attitudes 
among queer conservatives, before finally presenting important findings from regression 
and the general analyses. 
As noted above, the CCES dataset includes separate questions asking about the 
respondent's sexual orientation and gender identity. Often, concerns can be raised about 
the accurate representation of LGBTQ people in survey samples, as disclosing this 
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information can sometimes be risky or uncomfortable for the respondent. The Williams 
Institute at UCLA, which works exclusively on LGBTQ political and legal issues, has 
published a best practices guide for sampling LGBTQ people (Badgett 2009). The guide 
notes that providing secure and private environments for the survey frequently increases 
the rate of accurate self-identification. As Ansolabehere and Schaffuer (2016) explain in 
the 2016 dataset's guidebook, all 64,000 respondents were sampled via the internet, thus 
lessening potential concerns about accurate self-reporting. 
In creating a dataset for queer conservatives, a decision was made to use the 
CCES set's 5-point political ideology question instead of the 7-point party identification 
question. This decision was made for two reasons: first, there is obviously a difference 
been self-identified political ideology and self-identified party affiliation (Abramowitz 
and Saunders 1998; Greene 2004; Weinschenk 2010). One does not naturally preclude 
support for the other. Second, when one compares the ideology versus the party 
affiliation of the LGBTQ community, the results become very mixed. As Graph 1 below 
shows, once one moves past the expected Strong Democrat and Very Liberal correlation, 
there are strong pockets of independents as well as curious outliers such as 
Somewhat/Very Conservative and Strong Democrat (4,1 and 5,1). 
Therefore, the political ideology question was utilized for consistency and 
because, as noted in the previous section, differences exist between the queer right's 
ideology and their support of the Republican Party. So, to analyze the LGBTQ 
respondents in the 201 6  CCES dataset, three separate datasets were created. The first 
combined the two questions on sexual orientation and gender identity to create a set of 
LGBTQ respondents, totaling 5,1 17. Next, an independent sample of only conservative-
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identifying LGBTQ respondents was created. That sample size is 745. Finally, a general 
data set of all respondents identifying as conservative on the political ideology scale was 
created for comparison, totaling 1 8,688 people. 
Graph 1 
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Ideology: Left = More Libe .. al. Right = l\1orc Conservative 
The political ideology scale ranges from 1 =very liberal to 5=very conservative, and the 
party identification scale rangesfrom ]=strong Democrat to 7=strong Republican. 
To begin, simple demographic data was gathered on the conservative LGBTQ 
respondents. These demographics include age, race, gender, education level, family 
income, marital status, importance of religion, church attendance, and religious 
affiliation. The results are shown below in Table 1 .  
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Table 1 
Age Percent Race Percent 
18-24 88 11.8% White 550 74.1% 
25-34 176 23.8% Black 67 9.1% 
34-44 145 19.5% Hispanic 79 I0.6% 
45-54 90 12.2% Asian 17 2.3% 
55-64 128 17.3% Native American I I  l.4o/c 
65+ 114 I 5.4o/c Middle Eastern 7 0.9% 
Gender Percent Mixed IO I Jo/c 
Male 484 65.2o/c Other 2 30.0o/i 
Female 258 34.8o/c Education Percent 
Family Income Percent No HS 75 I 0.1 o/c 
<10,000 65 I O.Oo/c HS Graduar.c 221 29.8o/c 
IOk- 19,999 36 5.4o/c Some College 190 25.7o/c 
20K - 29,999 63 9.2o/c 2-Ycar 100 13.5o/c 
30k - 39,999 96 14.l o/c 4-Ycar 99 13.4o/c 
40k- 40,000 84 12.3% Post-Grad 56 7.5%o/c 
50k- 59,999 47 7 .Oo/c Party ID Percent 
60k - 69,999 46 7 .Oo/c Strong Dem 205 27. 7o/c 
70k - 79,999 49 7.1 o/c Not V Strong Dem 30 4.0o/c 
80k - 89,999 62 9.0o/c Lean Dem 24 3.2o/c 
IOOk- 119,999 63 9.3o/c Independent 46 6.2o/c 
120k- 149,999 45 6.6o/c Lean Rep !03 13.9o/c 
150k- 199,999 12 l.7o/c Not V Strong Rep 124 I 6.7o/c 
200k + 1 1  2.0% Stron R 201 27.1° 
Rclig Importance Percent Religious Dcnom. Percent 
Very 411 55.0o/c Protestant 272 36.6o/c 
Somewhat 190 25.6o/c Roman Catholic 239 32.2o/c 
Not Very 71 9.5o/c Mormon 15 2.0o/c 
Not At All 71 9.5o/c Estrn/Grcck Ortho 5 0.7o/c 
Church Attend Percent Jewish 15 2.1 o/c 
>Once a Weck 107 14.7% Muslim 1 1  1.5o/c 
Once a Weck 215 29.4° Buddhist 1 0.2o/c 
I or 2 a Month 67 9.2% Hindu 0 0.0° 
Few Times/Yr 109 15.0° Atbicst 16 2.2o/c 
Seldom 1 1 9  16.3° Agnostic 28 3.8o/c 
Never 112 l 5.3o/c Nothing Particular !03 14.0% 
Marital Status Percent Somcthin Else 35 4. 7o/c 
Married 331 44.7o/c 
Separated 15 2.0o/c 
Divorced 65 8.8% 
Widowed 21 2.8% 
Single 274 36.9% 
Domestic Partnrsh 35 4.7o/c 
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Several points on the demographic data are interesting to note. First, the sample of 
LGBTQ conservatives are predominantly white men, with 74% of the respondents being 
white and 65% male. Compared to the general conservative sample, there is more 
diversity among race but fewer women, as the general conservative sample is 8 1  % white 
but split 5 1 -49 male and female. When comparing these levels with the general LGBTQ 
population, one finds there are fewer white people in the sample, 69%, but the gender gap 
is also quite distinct, with 60% men and 40% women. 
The age range is also interesting to note. Even accounting for the slight spike of 
25-34 year olds in the conservative queer group, there is a decently even split among the 
age ranges. The age spread among the general LGBTQ population is fairly similar, with 
the same spike occurring around 25-34 year olds and remaining around 1 5-20% through 
the remaining ages. However, there notable differences between the queer and general 
conservative groups. The general conservative sample includes only 4.5% in the 1 8-24 
range, 13% for both the 25-34 and 35-44 ages, a slight spike of 17% for those 45-54, and 
51  % of the sample makes up those 55 and older. Social attitudes against homosexuality 
during the lives of the older members of the conservative population could be one reason 
why there are so fewer older queer conservatives. Yet, collapsing the older respondents in 
the queer conservative set to 55 and up brings a total of 32%, creating a wider age gap 
similar to the general conservative sample. 
Turning next to the religion statistics, it is unsurprising to find the majority of 
queer conservatives reporting Christian denominations. Both the importance of religion 
and church attendance rates are added to measure the religiosity of the sample. Church 
attendance is especially important to include, as it is often a better explainer of the impact 
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ofreligion on a person's politics (Malka et al 2012). Interestingly, the level of the 
importance of religion in queer conservatives' lives is significantly higher than that 
reported by the general LGBTQ population, with 80% of conservative queers reporting 
very or somewhat importance whereas only 50% of the general LGBTQ population rank 
religious importance similarly. But when we compare the queer conservatives with the 
general conservative sample, significantly similar results emerge. 82% of the general 
conservative sample rate religion as very or somewhat important in their lives. 
Finally, the fascinating mix of conservative political ideologies and Democratic 
Party affiliation is shown in the party identification scale. 27% of this sample identifies as 
a strong Democrat, compared to the almost identical rate for those identifying as a strong 
Republican. Expectedly, more respondents identify as some level of Republican. But, the 
number of those identifying as strong Democrats is even slightly stronger than those 
identifying as strong Republican. Attempting to establish a reason for this phenomenon is 
beyond the scope of this research, though an early assumption would be those identifying 
as both conservative and strong Democrats perhaps treat LGBTQ issues as their single 
issue, therefore identifying with the Democrats and their more pro-LGBTQ platform than 
the Republicans. 
Also included in the CCES data set are opinion questions asked of every 
respondent. Though they are only in a favor/oppose format, they cover several 
controversial political issues. Out of the 24 questions covering gun control, immigration, 
social issues, and environmental regulations, seven were chosen. These seven were 
selected for both their relevance in the 2016 election cycle and because they are 
frequently major departure points among liberals and conservatives. The questions as 
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well as the responses from the conservative LGBTQ respondents are detailed in Table 2 
below. 
Table 2 
Queer Conservatives: Favor/Oppose ... • N = 745 Gen. Conservatives: Favor/Oppose ... • N = 18,688 
Background Checks for Background Checks for 
All Gun Purchases Percent All Gun Purchases Percent 
Favor 635 86% Favor 15044 81% 
Oppose 99 13% Oppose 3558 19% 
Banning Assault Rifles Percent Banning Assault Rifles Percent 
Favor 357 49% Favor 8075 44% 
Oppose 380 51% Oppose 10459 56% 
Grant Legal Status to DREAMERS Percent Grant Legal Status to DREAMERS Percent 
Favor 257 35% Favor 5082 27% 
Oppose 485 65% Oppose 13606 72% 
ID and Deport Illegal Immigrants Percent ID and Deport Illegal Immigrants Percent 
Favor 411 55% Favor 12226 65% 
Oppose 330 45% Oppose 6462 35% 
Abortion Always Legal Percent Abortion Always Legal Percent 
Favor 384 52% Favor 5946 32% 
Oppose 358 48% Oppose 12723 68% 
Abortion Only Legal in Cases Abortion Only Legal in Cases 
of Rape, Incest, life of Mother Percent of Rape, Incest, Life of Mother Percent 
Favor 492 66% Favor 11329 61% 
Oppose 248 33% Oppose 7328 39% 
Same-Sex Marriage Percent Same-Sex Marriage Percent 
Favor 451 61% Favor 6083 34% 
Oppose 287 39% Oppose ll418 66% 
"Do you favor/oppose the following proposals? " Responses are of the conservative 
LGBTQ sample and general conservative sample. 
Like the demographic data of the queer conservative sample, there are similarities 
and some stark differences between this sample, the LGBTQ, and the general 
conservative respondents. Taking all questions into account, the queer conservative 
sample appears somewhat centrist to liberal on strict social issues like abortion and same-
sex marriage, but also shows their conservative lean regarding immigration. The support 
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among queer conservatives for requiring background checks on all gun purchases is fairly 
consistent with other respondents in the CCES data set, as well as national polling. 92% 
of the LGBTQ sample favors background checks, as do 8 1  % of the general conservative 
sample. And in 2017, the Pew Research Center found 84% of Americans favor 
background checks for private sales and at gun shows (Igielnek and Brown 2017). 
Also on guns, queer conservatives do not differ much from straight conservatives 
when it comes to banning assault rifles. 43% of the latter group favor such weapons 
versus the 56% opposed. The Pew Research Center notes 68% of Americans favor 
banning assault weapons. The general LGBTQ populace, however, highly favors banning 
these weapons with 73% supporting the proposal. 
On immigration, only 27% of the general conservative sample supports granting 
legal status to undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as 
minors, also known as DREAMers after the proposed DREAM Act to grant them a path 
to citizenship. Conservative LGBTQ people are only a few points more in favor of this 
proposal, and 55% are in favor of identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants, 
while 65% of heterosexual conservatives support such a proposal. The general LGBTQ 
sample shows the highest support for undocumented migrants, with 60% favoring 
granting legal status to DREAMers and only 27% support identifying and deporting 
undocumented immigrants. 
It is on the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage where queer conservatives 
differentiate greatly from both the general LGBTQ population and the general 
conservative sample. Only 32% of heterosexual conservatives support always allowing 
abortion as a matter of choice, versus 52% of the queer conservatives and 77% of the 
general queer sample. Similarly, 6 1  % of straight conservatives support abortion only in 
cases of rape, incest, and concerns for the mother's life, whereas 66% of queer 
conservatives support such a proposal but only 3 7% of the LGBTQ sample do. The 
opposition from the general LGBTQ sample may be because the question asks if they 
support abortion only in the instance of rape, incest, and the life of the mother. 
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The most startling statistic of the opinion questions, however, is the queer 
conservative response to same-sex marriage support. 39% oppose such a proposal. There 
does exist among LGBTQ folk some opposition to same-sex marriage, largely because 
they either care more about the legal benefits of the unions, or because they view 
marriage as patriarchal and heteronormative (Geoghegan 2013). The former argument 
could be at the root of many of those conservative LGBTQ people opposed to same-sex 
marriage, as respect for marriage as a foundation of society is often an accepted tenant of 
conservatism. Indeed, this argument has been used to support same-sex marriage from a 
conservative viewpoint (Angelo 2015; Rauch 2013). Similarly, Geoghegan notes that 
many gay couples are concerned more with some form of legal recognition to take 
advantage of spousal tax and legal benefits, making civil unions just as useful (2013). It 
seems unlikely, however, that one would find arguments against marriage as patriarchal, 
misogynistic, and heteronormative among queer conservatives as such an argument has 
largely only been found among more radical, liberationist, left-wing queer activists 
(Rimmerman 2008). 
To derive a possible explanation for this opposition, a simple linear regression 
was conducted, the results of which are detailed in Graph 2. The support/oppose same­
sex marriage question was tested against common demographic factors often associated 
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with political beliefs such as age, race, gender, education, and income levels. 
Interestingly, age is the only statistically significant independent variable. Given that the 
age range among the conservative queer sample is decently stratified with strong spikes 
among both younger and older members of the group, this outcome is especially curious. 
This range is highlighted in Graph 3. With 74% of the sample being white, it makes sense 
race would not be significant in the model. Yet, the spreads among gender, education, 
and income are more like the age spread than the racial demographics. 
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Each variable is numbered to signify its scaling for regression analysis. "Famine" is 
family income, and "educ " is highest level of education achieved. 
The magnitude of increase on the age variable is also worth mentioning. Not only 
is the variable very significant, but its increase shows that as one moves up in age the 
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more likely they are to oppose same-sex marriage. By identifying as either somewhat or 
strongly conservative, the queer right-wing in this dataset are likely to be more inclined 
already to oppose same-sex marriage, possibly for reasons explained above like states' 
rights issues or redefining marriage. Augmenting these political beliefs are the societal 
attitudes towards queer people as the older generations of queer conservatives were 
coming of age and being socialized politically, to say nothing of attitudes towards same-
sex marriage. 
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Unfortunately, because the CCES dataset was not designed specifically for queer 
respondents, we have little hard data to explain in further detail why conservative queer 
folk believe what they do. This is a limitation to address in future studies. However, what 
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the data do present is a larger picture than ever of conservative LGBTQ people's 
demographics and political beliefs. On aggregate, they look similar in many ways to both 
the LGBTQ population and straight conservatives. Intellectually, it is not hard to wrap 
one's head around the notion that not all queer people think the same and that the 
mainstream left-leaning LGBTQ rights movement is not a monolith. This data offers for 
one of the first times quantifiable justification to believe there are important similarities 
and differences between queer conservatives, the general queer community, heterosexual 
conservatives, and the American population at large. 
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HOMONATIONALISM AND THE QUEER CONSERVATIVE 
As has been argued throughout this study, the queer community does not exist nor 
think like a monolith. Simply because many LGBTQ people identify as liberal and as 
Democrats does not mean that the entire community agrees. Yet, when trying to ascertain 
the reasoning behind queer conservatism or explain the rise of far-right beliefs within the 
queer community, shrugging off the phenomenon as stemming from a simple diversity of 
political opinion does not suffice. As has been noted previously, the evolutions among 
the queer right are as important and consequential as the debates existing among the 
queer left, and no change in political socialization or attitude happens in a vacuum. 
Therefore, a broader explanation is necessary to truly attempt to understand the 
queer conservative, especially in a post-Obergefell America. To answer, I suggest Jasbir 
Puar's theory of homonationalism (2007). At its core, homonationalism describes the 
favorable relationship between nationalistic, specifically Islamophobic, ideologies and 
the LGBTQ community. One of the keys to this broader theme is the intersection 
between the queer community, post-9/1 1 foreign policy and national defense, and anti­
Islamic conservative politics. 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 1 1, 200 1 ,  right-wing advocates, 
politicians, and pundits have been using the threat of radical Islamic terrorism to bridge 
historic divides between the LGBTQ community and the right, and to gain more 
supporters from the queer community. Specifically, these advocates are among groups 
like the alt-right and other white supremacist and nationalistic organizations. Since 2015, 
founder of the alt-right Richard Spencer has been making specific overtures to the 
LGBTQ community, and these efforts have only increased since the Pulse shooting 
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(Falvey 2016; "Youth" 2015). Additionally, both the leaders of these movements and 
their supporters cite the killings of LGBTQ people at the hands ofradical groups like the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL and those affiliated with radical Islamic 
terrorist organizations as evidence that Islam is incompatible with Western values like 
protecting LGBTQ rights (Greenwald 20 1 6). 
However, while tragedies like the killing ofLGBTQ people at the hands ofISIS 
and the Pulse nightclub shooting are jarring and emotionally compelling, these incidents, 
with hindsight, have proven to be more exaggerated and sensationalist than originally 
assumed. OutRight Action International, one of the leading international LGBTQ human 
rights organizations, tracked the number of ISIL confirmed killings of queer people from 
2014 to 2016. Their research found that 90 LGBTQ people were killed by ISIS fighters in 
that two-year span, though it should be noted that they included in their findings the 49 
people killed in the Pulse shooting ("Timeline" 2016). Removing the Pulse shooting 
brings their total to 4 1 .  While the killing of anyone is tragic, 90 murders over the span of 
two years does not strike this researcher as actual evidence for an epidemic. 
Meanwhile, the Pulse shooting itself provides still greater context to the 
difference between compelling political and emotional narratives and the reality of these 
events. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, media pundits, activists, and 
politicians whipped up a flurry of theories and explanations for the shooting. Within 
hours, a cohesive narrative immerged: because the shooter allied himself with ISIL, and 
because Pulse is an LGBTQ club, the shooter purposefully chose to target queer people. 
Simply put, the shooting was a hate crime (Greenwald 201 6). 
Additional speculation came in the form of the common trope of the sexually 
confused and frustrated closeted gay man. Patrons of Pulse claimed to have seen the 
shooter at the nightclub on a few occasions (Brinkmann 2017). And, the shooter's ex­
wife claimed she had wondered about the shooter's sexuality while they were married, 
saying: "He would take a long time in front of the mirror, be would often take 
pictures of himself, and he made little movements with his body that definitely 
made me question things" (Alter 201 6). 
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And yet, despite these theories becoming the assumed motive of the 
shooter, recent findings have proven these theories to be more conspiratorial than 
fact. During the trial for the shooter's second wife (she was accused of knowing 
about the attack days before it happened), evidence from the FBI revealed there to 
be no factual evidence that any of the suggested motives were genuine (Greenwald 
and Hussain 201 8). The FBI revealed that at no point during the hours-long 
standoff at Pulse did the shooter ever spout homophobic justifications, nor is it 
believed the shooter even knew Pulse to be a queer club prior to the attack 
(Fitzsimons 2 0 1 8).  Rather, the shooter cited US military affairs in the Middle East 
as his main justification. And, evidence from the night of the assault confirmed the 
shooter had originally intended to attack Disney resorts, only to find them too well 
protected (Greenwald and Hussain 201 8). 
As noted above, the Pulse massacre has been one of the most widely cited 
incidents of radical Islamic terrorism used as a form of propaganda to bring queer 
people into the right-wing fold. President Trump's high profile remarks on 
protecting LGBTQ Americans stems entirely from this line of thinking, as does the 
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justification for greater restrictions on Muslims in America and Western Europe. 
Alice Weide!, the openly-lesbian leader of the far-right Alternative for 
Deutschland (AID) party in Germany referenced the attack in ber campaign rallies 
and as justification for a lesbian leading a party whose members are generally anti­
LGBTQ (Vlad 2 0 1 7). Additionally, leader of the French far-right party the 
National Front Marine Le Pen has employed the same anti-Muslim rhetoric in 
overtures to the French LGBTQ community (Wildman 2 0 1 7).  
Puar defines homonationalism as the "transition under way in how queer 
subjects are relating to nation-states, particularly the United States, from being 
figures of death (i.e.,  the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and 
productivity (i .e.,  gay marriage and families)" (2007, xii).  Tn other words, 
homonationalism describes how political and power interests align with general 
LGBTQ equality to advance xenophobic positions under the guise that foreigners, 
specifically Muslims, are supposedly homophobic and are thus incompatible with 
the superior egalitarianism of the West. 
Recall President Trump's overtures to the LGBTQ community during his 
nomination acceptance speech: "As your president, I will do everything in my power 
to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful foreign 
ideology" (Johnson 20 1 6). Trump's rhetoric, like that of far-right leaders and polemicists 
like Richard Spencer, Jack Donovan, and Milo Yiannopoulos, bases his support for the 
queer community as entirely against a foreign ideology. While he never explicitly 
mentions Islam, remember also that Trump's nomination came only weeks after the Pulse 
shooting. 
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Of course, homonational.ist overtures to the queer community have existed 
prior to the Pulse shooting. Chavez (20 1 5 )  notes that queer support for 
immigration reform via the 1 990 Immigration Act spearheaded by the openly gay 
Congressman Barney Frank led some on the right to blame Frank and the .. gay 
agenda" for the September 1 1 th attacks (Chavez 2 0 1 5).  However, a combination of 
increased LGBTQ rights (and thus greater inclusion of queer people in American 
society), the rise of extreme terrorist groups like ISIS, and the Pulse shooting have 
pushed homonational ist justifications to the fore. 
Puar explains in her foundational book Terrorist Assemblages that as queer 
people move from being maligned in society for their personhood or because of 
reactions to the AIDS epidemic, they wil l  naturally take a more mainstream hold 
in society (2007). With increasing inclusion in the mil itary (tbe main defense 
against terrorism), greater civi l  protections. and the right to marry and adopt 
chi ldren, queer people have moved to this position postulated by Puar. Thus, as 
Puar argues, as queer people, especially those of privilege like white gay men, are 
included more in society, they will  naturally become more concerned with the 
wellbeing of the state and the society in which they have adopted and has adopted 
them. 
As pointed out in the previous section, the overwhelming majority of queer 
conservatives are white men. Not only are they the first to be included in the 
political society which once excluded them (Schotten 20 1 6), but they are the 
perfect candidates for nationalist politics either explicitly or implicitly advocating 
for white supremacy at most, and Western/American exceptionalism at best. The 
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synthesis of increasing queer rights and backlash against the replacement outgroup 
for the LGBTQ community, Muslims, is exemplified in the remarks expanded 
upon previously by both queer far-right conservatives and heterosexual 
nationalists appealing only to a queer person 's right to life. 
Of course, homonationalism has its faults. It is not a catch-all theory for 
every queer conservative. However, as I have argued, queer conservatism has 
always existed, and even when it finally became public with the advent of the Log 
Cabin Republicans, it has existed solidly in traditional conservative thinking. The 
novelty of the evolving far-right queer conservative is best explained through 
homonationalism, and the many ways increasing populist nationalism bas 
influenced American political thought is also exemplified through the queer far­
right conservative. 
Unfortunately, the interplay between bomonationalism and queer 
conservatism is difficult to document. However, since the Pulse shooting, there 
has been enough evidence to apply this theory originating from queer theorists to 
political science interpretations of changing political beliefs. I argue it is only 
through an intersectional approach of traditionally understood demographic 
influences on political ideologies and the broader national conversation 
surrounding conservatism, terrorism, queer rights. and the inclusivity of all in a 
broader American soc iety can we truly understand the origins and influences of 
queer conservatism. 
50 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the increasing influence of queer Americans on the political 
Landscape and the growing research explaining these political phenomenon, I have 
argued that not enough attention has been paid to queer conservatism. Tracing its 
organizational lineage through the Log Cabin Republicans to growing numbers of 
far-right LGBTQ conservatives, this study has documented the many shades of 
queer conservatism. Furthermore. data analysis has provided with some of the best 
data available a detailed snapshot of not only the general makeup of LGBTQ 
conservatives, but some of their political beliefs as well .  Finally, a broader 
explanation of rising far-right queer conservatism was offered through the theory 
of bomonationalism. 
This research has not been an attempt to describe in every way queer 
conservatism or act as a historical analysis. Rather, the guiding purpose behind 
blurring this spectrum is to chip away at a segment of the queer community often 
less explored but still critical to the understanding of queer politics. Findings from 
this research underscore two important. though perhaps obvious conclusions. First, 
queer conservatives share many similarities between both the general (that is to 
say, left-leaning) LGBTQ population as well as the mainstream conservative 
movement. Second, queer conservatism, like queer politics generally, are quite 
complex and thus deserving of greater exploration. 
These complexities and this research offer important implications. One of 
the most frequent criticism heard from queer conservatives is that it  is harder to 
come out as queer and conservative than it is to come out as queer ("'Gay 
5 1  
Journalist" 201 7). I f  it  appears this study bas been overly critical of the current 
state of research on the full spectrum of sexuality politics, it is unintentional. 
Instead, the criticisms and arguments offered here are meant to shed light on a part 
of queer politics needed in every level of research into sexuality politics. 
Second, queer conservatism cuts to the core of our understanding of 
political socialization. Though not previously discussed, some researchers believe 
the "coming out" process may be its own form of political socialization - or in 
many cases, re-socialization. Coming out as queer can lend itself to a recalibration 
not only of political beliefs but also the communities i n  which queer people find 
support (Avery 2002; Egan 2 0 1 2 ). Additionally, it's believed the process of a 
queer person finding support within their conception of the queer community may 
reorient their political compass to be more like those i n  their community, thus 
possibly explaining why so many in the queer community are left-leaning besides 
simple party identification. H owever, if we understand queer conservatives to go 
through the same coming out process, how does the coming out process, and 
political socialization generally, account for the noticeable number of queer 
conservatives? 
Above all,  however, the interactions between the queer community and far­
rigbt political ideologies highlights the extent to which ideologies, especially 
reactionary ones, can influence the politics of a society. I f  anything. this research 
underscores the importance of taking the politics and influences of sexuality -
both heterosexual and queer - into general and specific accounts of changing 
political trends. The political cJout of the queer community is well documented 
(Black et al. 2000; Faderman 2 0 1 5; Gates 2 0 1 1 ;  Huang et al 20 1 6).  I f  we are to 
better understand the intersections impacting the political sphere of human 
behavior, it is imperative we include every stop along that road. 
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